there is no actual claim, Mou suggests, there can be no proper refutation. The perfect teaching thus surrounds the inscrutable content of moral metaphysics concealed in the intimate and externally impenetrable experience of intellectual intuition with a rhetorical bulwark repelling any attempt at external criticism by its very design. Yet, Mou's philosophy, thus triumphing over any objection, by the same token also deprives itself of the means to speak in its own favor and further underscores its reliance on the authority of its enunciator. At the same time, understanding Mou's interpretation of the perfect teaching is crucial for grasping two main characteristics of his philosophy.
First, tracing Mou's conception of the perfect teaching and its relation to the summum bonum, we can grasp the very mechanism that disconnects the meaning of a teaching from its particular linguistic shape. We can comprehend Mou's tendency, surprising for a thinker who sharpened his conceptual tools with the whetstone of Kant's critical philosophy, to conflate, at the very core of his philosophy, what appears to us the most divergent and incompatible expressions from vastly different intellectual traditions. That Mou thinks himself justified to recognize in Kant's free will just another name for what Confucians refer to as liangzhi 良知 (the unconditioned "genuine knowledge [of the Good]") or what Buddhists designate as lijing 理 境 (something like the unconditioned "sphere of Buddha's reality") is an immediate consequence of this framework: whether we capture the ultimate meaning to which the perfect teaching is directed by the name of "free will," "liangzhi," "lijing," "ti" 體, "substance," "ultimate reality," or by any other term, our choice will not affect what it is. The common meaning of all these terms is what they designate -the reality of the Good -and this remains unaffected by its varying titles.
Second, understanding the perfect teaching, moreover, enables us to appreciate its crucial function for establishing what Mou understands as the primacy of practical over theoretical reason: perfect doctrines according to Mou are specifically construed in a way leading the individual to experiencing the reality of the Good in his or her moral practice. Hence it is inherently connected to the idea of a positive notion of intellectual intuition according to which it is in actu that morality gains its exis tential and creative dimension, as through our moral acts we can really change our world for the better. Making accessible to us a genuine experience of the actual ity or facticity of morality, the perfect teaching also considerably lightens our burden theoretically to found it. The reality of morality is essentially independent from our representations of it, and what eventually validates our theories about morality is that they guide us on the right Way of moral practice.
Yet, even if we understand why Mou thinks that the framework of a perfect teaching can emend the deficiencies of Kant's moral theology and of his notion of the summum bonum, his specific attempt to translate Kantianism into the form of a perfect teaching, his so-called two-tiered ontology, at least on Kantian terms patently fails.
After this rather disconcerting conclusion, I shall propose, in the second part of this essay, a more charitable reading of Mou: I argue that there is a close resemblance of Mou's attempt to rescue traditional Confucian views of an intuitive access to truth to the project of those German idealists who tried to reconcile the truth of reason with the inherited truth of revelation.
We shall, moreover, see that there is a certain tension in what Mou says. If he is right, what the Confucian teacher transmits is a universally accessible truth -even if it is intuitive in nature, it is an insight into what is morally good. In Hegelian terms, Confucianism with Mou thus has become subjective rather than merely positive. Taken to the letter, Mou's restoration of the authority of the teacher therefore eventually seems to be built on sand: if he is unwilling to qualify and thus trim the subjective character of moral intuition, he has to forsake the authority of tradition. If he really endorses the consequences of his "subjectivization" of the Confucian tradition, Mou has to acknowledge that moral intuition is a common good of all people rather than the privilege of a small group of educated Confucians.
I shall eventually conclude with a short and very preliminary sketch adumbrating how Mou's thought, once stripped of its grandiose metaphysical rhetoric, might fruitfully be related to the problem of human freedom in the tension between rationalism and naturalism.
Philosophy as a Kowtow to Confucius
I start my discussion with a short look at the conclusion of Mou's last major work, The Perfect Good, which highlights the crucial role of the perfect teaching for his thought. Mou writes here the following verses:
In China, just as in the West, there were wise men, and there were sages, Their ultimate resort men find in founding Varied spelling out of the perfect teaching. And in this endeavor, Confucius was to reach the truth. 3 Mou in a final eulogy eventually continues:
The Confucian Sage tacitly harbored Heaven's constant norm within himself, Mencius broke the dark, disclosed the light of sun and moon, illuminating a new dawn. . . . A light, though, obfuscated by both Master Zhu Xi and Cheng Yi. A light which Lu Xiangshan in reading Mencius attained within himself, A light whose norm was newly gauged and truly mastered by Wang Yangming, A norm perfectly contained in the Four Affirmations and Four Negations of its Goodness, A norm whose perfect teaching was only raised by Wang Ji. As a single-rooted unified body and embodiment, it is true perfection, . . . As virtue and happiness indistinctly unify in this perfect actual fact, Why toil oneself to claim a God for effectuating [this reconciliation] in our stead? I now and here proclaim and reclaim the Perfect Good, In a kowtow to the model left behind by Confucius. 4 Given its prominent position at the end of Mou's last major publication, in many respects a summa of his lifework, this poetic resumé of the book's last chapter, on the "perfect teaching" of Confucianism, also appears like a condensed formula of his entire philosophical heritage. Essentially, Mou's hymn is an emphatic confession to Confucius. And although the word itself finds no mention, when Mou delineates the transmission and growing awareness of that inner constant norm that allegedly led Confucius on his Way of moral cultivation, which was explicated by Mencius and eventually elevated to the level of a "perfect teaching" by Wang Ji 王畿 (Longxi 龍溪) (1498-1583), he offers his version of the Confucian daotong. Attributing to Confucius the attainment of the apogee of wisdom as that which introduces the "perfect teaching," Mou conceals that he borrows the very notion of a "perfect teaching" from a Buddhist context. 5 Mou's poem, mentioning the "West" at its very beginning, relocates the continuity of the Way in a context of global competition.
Largely coinciding with Westernization, modernization in twentieth-century China is perceived as a challenge to the continuation of Chinese culture. 6 Intimately related to the model of self-cultivation allegedly harkening back to Confucius, Chinese culture for Mou essentially rests on a deeply ingrained sense of morality. After all, it was his inner moral compass that invested the historical Confucius with the authority to become the paragon of a specifically Chinese paradigm of moral cultivation. 7 His own contribution to the daotong Mou situates in the context of the confrontation of Confucian moral cultivation with the West. When he claims the "Perfect Good" (yuanshan 圓善), Kant's summum bonum, Mou does nothing less than to proclaim the universal significance of the Way, as, in his view, the philosophical deficiencies of Kant are manifest exactly in his inability to conceive a viable concept of the summum bonum. This purported insufficiency marks the point where Mou sees himself justified to claim the ability, by virtue of standing in the line of transmission of the Confucian Way, to lead to completion what the German philosopher was incapable of achieving, namely really to rank morality higher than empirical knowledge and to endorse an emphatic notion of the priority of practical over theoretical or speculative reason. To be sure, the name of Kant here is an epitome of Western philosophy as a whole, and Mou leaves no doubt that it was the limitations of his Western background that impeded Kant. The purported shortcomings of the externally dominant West thus most strikingly surface in the limitations of its most advanced philosophy, Kantianism. 8 As I have shown elsewhere, the crucial step in Mou's appropriation of Kantian moral philosophy lies in his identification of Kant's notion of autonomy with the Mencian "heart" (xin 心).
Consequently, his short poem stages as the key persons of the correct line of transmission of the Way the main representatives of the xinxue 心學, "learning of the heart," and he takes the opportunity to accuse the obfuscation, by their opponents of the "orthodox" Cheng-Zhu school, of the moral autonomy allegedly enshrined in the Mencian heart. As is widely known, Mou's integration of Kantian autonomy into the framework of Confucianism hinges on his adoption of a positive notion of "intellectual intuition," imagined to reveal, in moral feeling, the norm that leads the Confucian sage and that realizes or embodies itself in moral action. Moral action is here conceived as the experience in actu of the empirical subject's dislimitation and the alleged realization of man's essence as an infinite or unlimited being. 9 It is precisely to this ecstatic practice of morality that the "perfect actual fact" of Mou's poem refers. As in this "perfect actual fact" morality and happiness allegedly coalesce, it renders obsolete Kant's notion of the summum bonum, which can only relegate us to a mere hope -though justified rationally -that there is a God who eventually bridges the radically separate spheres of sensual happiness and intellectual morality. The linguistic resemblance of the Chinese equivalents for "Perfect Good" (yuanshan 圓善) and "perfect teaching" (yuanjiao 圓教) thus reflects their intimate relation in the context of Mou's moral philosophy: the perfect teaching provides Mou with a language for speaking about the Perfect Good. Ultimately treating language as a means of instruction rather than representation, a perfect teaching is imagined to clear the way to our personal experience of the actual reality of an unconditioned Good.
Mou on the Perfect Teaching in Tiantai Buddhism
If we want to understand the systematic implications of Mou's decision to choose the form of the perfect teaching as the adequate linguistic expression for his own philosophy, we first have to see how according to Mou it is used its original context, the scholastic literature of the Buddhist Tiantai school. He has dedicated half of his two-volume work on Chinese Buddhism, Buddhatva and Prajñā (1977) , to this denomination. 10 Although basically a collection of exegetical notes and terminological clarifications on various Buddhist texts, Mou makes it clear in his introduction that he composes this book as a historian of Chinese philosophy rather than as a Buddhologist. Accordingly, he claims impartiality for his view that the perfect teaching of Tiantai represents the intellectual culmination of Buddhist scholastics in China. 11 The purpose of the perfect teaching is doxographical: it is designed for integrating the immense multiplicity of the Buddha's teachings and their interpretations into a single comprehensive, and hence perfected, framework.
The Method and Form of the Perfect Teaching
Mou recognizes in the perfect teaching a formidable linguistic tool to provide the required figure of this all-inclusiveness: in their expositions, instead of claiming definite doctrinal contents (jiaoyi 教義), Tiantai exegetes are said to concentrate on the ultimate concern of their teaching: the Buddha's universal realization of liberation. 12 Unlike other doctrinal traditions such "genuine explanations" (zhengshuo 正說) 13 establish linguistic distinctions exclusively as a means for pointing toward this reality beyond language. 14 Sentences here are not viewed as asserting definite propositions. Thus "sterilized" (si 死) as bearers of independent meaning or propositional truth, they are considered mere "expedients" (quan 權) of the Buddha's salvific work. As testimonies of this soteriological practice, his various teachings are recognized as ultimately identical in commonly pointing toward one and the same reality: the inconceivable realm of the reality of the Buddha's universal liberation (li 理, jing 境, or li jing 理境). This reality, hence, is the single meaning common to all of his teachings. 15 In spite of their fundamental difference, the teachings belong to the relative realm of conditioned arising and the reality of the Buddha to the absolute realm of liberation; the teachings, insofar as they are efficacious means of liberation, also partake in the reality of liberation and in this respect prove identical to it (quan jishi shi 權即是實). 16 According to Mou, Tiantai exegesis thus reveals a paradoxical "identity" of expedients and reality. 17 The real meaning (yili zhi shi 義理之實) of a perfect teaching consequently does not belong to the sphere of semantics; it is the reality of liberation. 18 This reality, according to Mou, can also be grasped in very concrete terms: Note that what we encounter here is reminiscent of Mou's vision of Confucianism: the Buddhist practitioner in his compassionate act immediately experiences the efficiency of an absolute reality. Just as the empirical subject in Mou's moral metaphysics is said to turn into an agent of morality, both limited by remaining the concrete person he was before and unlimited by coalescing with the unlimited moral heart itself, the undetached and ignorant sentient being in the moment of engaging in an act of compassion is imagined to partake in the reality of the Buddha's universal liberation.
The Linguistic Form of the Perfect Teaching
As we have mentioned above, the specificity of the language of the perfect teaching is in its non-contending character, which is in turn entwined with the notion of a non-contending wisdom. In the state of non-contending wisdom, one listening to the Buddha's words does not take the various formulations of his teachings to the letter. The attempt to seek for consistency by discarding incompatibilities or contradictions appears obsolete to him. 21 All words of the Buddha are recognized as nothing but means of salvation. According to this view, their particular claims in the last resort appear ultimately irrelevant. According to Mou, the exclusively "instrumental" character of the Buddha's speech renders his words "unnecessary" so that objecting to them appears futile. 22 For Mou, necessity is a privilege of the absolute and ultimately all-inclusive reality of the Buddha. For this reason, nothing that can be asserted in differentiating speech can be necessary. Non-contending wisdom accepts the inconsistencies and contradictions in Buddha's teachings as an effect not of what he claims but to whom he preaches. From this perspective, raising a genuine objection against any of the Buddha's words ipso facto implies debasing oneself by getting involved in a less-inclusive and hence deficient mode of linguistic practice. Thus, for Mou, "noncontending wisdom" "is opposed to differentiating speech without belonging to the same level." 23 On the purely linguistic level, "non-contending" wisdom has to be couched in a "non-contending perfect teaching" in "non-differentiating terms." 24 There can be only one non-contending perfect teaching, as, in contradistinction to less inclusive teachings, its "non-contending character" obliges it to desist from presenting disputable, let alone disprovable explanations. 25 The linguistic strategy for overcoming the deficiencies of differentiating speech is the "paradox" (guijue 詭譎): whatever is positively asserted is immediately hedged by the opposite contention. However, this negation is not supposed simply to cancel the preceding positive claim. Rather it is aimed at elevating the consciousness of the listener above the mode of thinking in binary opposites. Aware of the soteriological sterility of thinking in alternatives, noncontending perfect teachings discard the search for clarity by binary decisions: a non-contending perfect teaching does not rebuff objections, because such a step would force it back into the deficient realm of apparent alternatives. Rather, by virtue of its all-inclusiveness a non-contending perfect teaching simply defuses objections by absorbing them. The defect of differentiating speech, which Mou supposes the perfect teaching to cure, is thus its very property of being contestable: "All differentiating speech is contestable. 26 There is a possibility of manifold alternatives all of which cannot be perfect." 27 On the Perfect Doctrine of Confucianism When Mou applies this paradigm of the perfect teaching to Confucianism, he states -in some tension with what he elsewhere says with respect to the Buddha's soteriological practice -that the perfect teaching of Confucianism "differs from Buddhism and Daoism in that it cannot directly be arrived at by means of paradoxical language," 28 but rather "evolves from a moral consciousness [that] anchors it vertically in moral creation." 29 This suggests that, for Mou, the specific emphasis on morality so typical for Confucianism is not essential to perfect teachings per se. However, there is one key passage in Buddhatva and Prajñā where Mou suggests that a genuine perfect teaching does indeed require a moral consciousness, even if this may have gone unnoticed by Buddhist exegetes:
The Buddha is [still] a sage according to a one-sided paradigm (pianzhixing zhi sheng ren 偏至型之聖人). When the Tiantai speaks about perfect reality (yuanshi 圓實) it does so with respect to this one-sided paradigm of the Buddha. However, the point where the kind of perfect reality that it speaks about is ultimately realized rather is the case of the Confucian sage. The Buddha still has to develop moral consciousness (daode yishi 道德意識). Only then is he able completely to achieve perfect reality. (emphasis mine) 30 For Mou, the Buddhists, in spite of providing the perfect paradigm of wisdom, seem unable to complement it with the most accurate model of cultivation, namely the "cultivation of the inner sage" (neisheng gongfu 內聖功夫). 31 In the same book Mou writes in the same vein:
We can only say that, when Buddhism, at the end of its sweeping development, has reached its highest peak, namely the perfect teaching of the Tiantai, in the last consequence it still leads to the Confucian sage's sphere of being a "prisoner of Heaven (tian zhi lu min 天之戮民) [Confucius' self-designation in Zhuangzi 6.6]." 32 Mou thus clearly distinguishes between the "one-sided perfection" (pianyuan 偏圓) of the Buddha and the "well-adjusted" or "genuine perfection" (zhengyuan 正圓) of the Confucian sage. 33 I think that Mou's contention that, ultimately, Buddhist and Confucian perfection lead to the same sphere can be interpreted in the sense that, strangely enough, Confucianism is the ultimate realization of what Buddhist practice is aimed at. For Mou, there is no doubt that its moral character exalts the Confucian Way over Buddhism. Mou, hence, is convinced that Buddhism indeed does imply a moral dimension that Buddhist scholasticism, however, fails to recognize or to acknowledge.
As we have seen, Mou credits Wang Ji for providing Confucianism with a perfect teaching when, in his "four negations" of Wang Yangming's "teaching in four sentences," he rejects the distinction of "good" versus "bad" for the successive levels of the genuine heart itself (xin zhi ti 心之體), the intentions preceding one's actions (yi 意), the awareness of the moral character of these intentions (liangzhi 良知), and the actual performance of one's actions (ge wu 格物). 34 Given its crucial role for his conception of a specifically Confucian understanding of autonomy, it is hardly surprising that Mou's discussion here revolves around Wang Ji's treatment of the notion of the "heart" or "mind" (xin). Setting in with a qualification of Wang Ji's expression of a "heart without a heart" (wu xin zhi xin 無 心 之心), Mou clarifies that the expression wu 無 here "only means an absence on the level of the presentational function of the heart, that is, an absence of consciousness. It is no absence on the level of existence (cunyou shang 存有上)." 35 For Mou, Wang thus distinguishes the genuine heart itself from its manifestation as an awareness of the moral value of our acts. Characterizing the genuine heart as "knowledge without the distinctive characteristics of knowledge" (wu zhi xiang zhi zhi 無知相之知), Mou suggests that the genuine heart is real even if it is possible that one is not aware of it. For him, "genuine knowledge of the Good (liangzhi) is always spontaneous (ziran 自 然) and never brought about intentionally (you yi 有意)." 36 Apparently it is precisely this spontaneity that authenticates its ontological dimension. Mou's point seems to be that genuine knowledge, due to its nonintentional character, is not prone to the potentially distorting effects of cognitive representation. If it is exclusively in cognition that illusion and error arise, something instantiating itself spontaneously and entirely independently from representational cognition consequently cannot fall victim to either. We thus have to distinguish genuine knowledge as the uncaused cause of moral action from genuine knowledge as the conscience of the moral value of our actions allegedly springing from that source. The latter is knowledge of something, and hence displays what Mou calls the "characteristic of knowledge" -it is relational and relative in character. Contrary to this, the former is pure actual presence devoid of any relative knowledge of something. It is characterized as a "clear awareness" (mingjue 明覺). With regard to Wang Ji's controversial claim that genuine knowledge (liangzhi) is neither good nor bad, Mou explains that the norm of moral judgment epitomized in genuine knowledge is not susceptible to either of these expressions. The application to it of both predicates rather turns out to be "meaningless." 37 The perfect teaching of Confucianism as presented by Mou purportedly deals with differentiating language in exactly the same way as does Tiantai exegesis: Wang Ji negates the predicates that he had previously asserted affirmatively. His intention obviously is not bluntly to deny his positive claims. The affirmative assertion is not canceled, but only modified by negation. Genuine knowledge is good, as it is the source and cause allowing us to recognize and realize what is good. At the same time, it also is not good, because, as the absolute standard of good and bad, it is not good in a privative sense, which would imply something bad opposed to it. The effect of this "paradoxation" is the metaphorization of the predicate -the subject escapes the assignment of the predicate, which is only transferred to it in a figurative sense.
It is easy to see that there will be no predicate that does not allow for being treated in an analogous way. We can thus infer that, ultimately, such a mechanism of mutual neutralization of affirmation and negation is infinite, necessarily leaving the subject toward which the predications are directed out of the reach of language. Even if there would be something absolutely good it would not be possible to capture it by the common assertive use of predicative language. Precisely for answering the question how it can be grasped at all, Mou designs a specific kind of perfect teaching.
Inclusive Perfect Teachings: Toward Experiencing the Absolute
When he adopts the paradigm of the perfect teaching for his brand of Confucianism, Mou introduces a subcategory of perfect teachings, which he calls "inclusive" (ying 盈). They are said to be able to disclose (langxian 朗現) an unlimited heart or mind by virtue of individual practice. 38 In his attempt to delineate the way that allegedly allows one to arrive at such an inclusive teaching, Mou states that "although knowledge of one single path only reveals one meaning (yi 義), it is nonetheless an unlimited heart or mind; for that reason, the single meaning that it reveals in spite of the doctrine's limits is not limited itself. As a consequence, one also does not stick to that meaning by excluding others. The reason is that if it would exclude others the heart or mind would no more be unlimited." 39 This ability of revealing meaning without sticking to specific doctrinal formulae is identified by Mou as the "pervasive" or "universal" (tong 通) character of inclusive teachings. Obviously, this pervasive character itself is no teaching, but simply the "mutual pervasion of individual perfect and inclusive teachings." 40 Rendered in terms of Mou's paradoxical language, one thus has a teaching without the "'characteristics of a teaching' (jiaoxiang 教相): one grasps the meaning and forgets the teaching." 41 Mou, who elsewhere defines a teaching as "whatever suffices to instigate human reason and to guide human beings to practice the purification of their human lives to the utmost degree," 42 obviously does not consider the Confucian teaching a theoretical or exegetical exposition, 43 but rather an instruction for a practice of moral selfperfection. Its "meaning" consequently is disclosed to an individual precisely when it is overwhelmed and compelled to action by his or her moral feeling. For Mou this "feeling," as we have seen, is not part of the sensual human subject but rather indicative of its coalescence with the unlimited moral mind -Mou's genuine heart. Mou understands it as the moral law imposing itself on an individual subject and translating into spontaneous action. As genuine awareness of the moral law is claimed exclusively to occur in the very performance of a moral act, its meaning is always actual. This also implies that it eventually evades representation: the real meaning of the moral norm or law is its being executed. Isolated from its concrete experience, the moral norm hence remains a void catchword. The single possibility to understand it is to experience it.
What is called the "real truth" in the Tiantai exegesis therefore coincides for Mou with the "moral norm" (li 理) of Confucians. Precisely because this meaning is something actual and essentially non-linguistic, Mou suggests that it is not essential to it how it is named. In my view, this is the essence of Mou's statement above on the inclusive teaching: as perfect teachings are designed to lead to practical moral action and thereby to the actual awareness of the moral norm, they are ultimately conducive to the revelation of one and the same meaning. Essentially non-linguistic, this ultimate meaning remains the same although its designation varies according to different perfect teachings.
Absolute Meaning and the Task of Rescuing Kantianism
When, in the preface to his Phenomenon and the Thing in Itself, Mou elevates the method of understanding the various teachings, "according to their meaning rather than to their formulations," 44 to the status of a leading principle of his philosophical engagement with different Chinese traditions, but also with Kantian moral philosophy, he suggests that in spite of their vastly different backgrounds and concerns there is a way to read these extremely divergent writings with regard to their allegedly ultimate goal: the attainment in actu of an awareness of the meaning of the moral norm. Kant's summum bonum for him is thus simply yet another name pointing toward this essence of moral practice: in the monograph dedicated to this notion, Mou consequently claims that the solution to the "Western" problem of the "Highest Good" as highlighted by Kant can be found in the moral norm of the perfect teachings of the East. 45 Mou closes his discussions on the Perfect Good with the statement that "if the perfect teaching is achieved, then the Perfect Good is clarified. . . . Philosophical thought (sikao 思考) ends at this point." 46 Western doctrines, Christianity, and, more specifically, Kant's moral theology in the framework of the perfect teaching are classified as "exclusive teachings" (lijiao 離 教). For understanding this term, remember that the opposite, "inclusive teachings," were defined by Mou by their potential to disclose the unlimited heart by individual practice. Yet, according to Mou, awareness of the unlimited or absolute in Christianity remains on the level of linguistic distinctions: it is conceptualized as an ultimately void reification termed God. Conceived as an absolute Other, it is stuck at the level of representation. Because as such it is understood in terms of an absolute difference, the aim of an inclusive perfect doctrine, namely to attain an awareness of an essential or underlying identity of the empirical self with God in moral practice, seems out of reach.
As we have just said, even Kant relies on the concept of God as the capstone of his moral philosophy, which thereby transforms into a moral theology. From the perspective of a perfect teaching it consequently falls into the category of an "exclusive" teaching. Completing Kant for Mou therefore requires raising it to an "inclusive" one, and this intention is tantamount to claiming that it has to provide for the possibility that the absolute can be practically experienced. Precisely this is what is warranted, in Mou's philosophy, by the positive notion of intellectual intuition.
In applying to Kant's moral philosophy the framework of the "inclusive" perfect teaching with its orientation toward a practical experience of absolute reality in moral action, Mou for one thing is forced to treat it in the same way as Christian theology, and we may suspect that it is for this reason that the fundamental difference between both critical philosophy and dogmatic metaphysics and theology might have escaped his attention; for another, much more vexingly, it might have escaped his attention that what is the highest merit of Kant's philosophy in his view, namely the transcendental foundation of the a priori and universal character of moral autonomy, essentially hinges on preserving the fundamental conceptual distinctions and theoretical premises of critique. Identifying Kant's philosophical language as a mere expedient for the ultimate realization of moral practice in the framework of a perfect teaching is to forsake the foundation of critique as a whole. Moral autonomy deprived of its specific conceptual design ends up as mere figurative speech. Even if we accept Mou's claim that in moral action we can become aware of the reality of an unconditioned moral norm, it appears meaningless to interpret this in terms of an actual experience of man's moral autonomy -at least if one appeals to the respective Kantian concept. 47 We conclude that the very framework of the perfect teaching itself, if applied to Kantian critique, cannot but distort the latter's essentials. Yet, what Mou claims is exactly that the paradigm of a perfect teaching enables one to conceive of a Kantian Perfect Good without the need to hope for God as its exclusive, yet merely ideal guarantee. The reason put forward by Mou is that only a perfect teaching can warrant that "practical reason is fully realized," 48 a phrase obviously alluding to the kind of realization of the genuine heart in one's concrete moral act allegedly accessed through intellectual intuition. As Mou sees it, Kant was forced to conceive of morality and religion as two separate spheres, because the Chinese tradition of a perfect teaching was unavailable to him. Consequently, Mou purports, Kant lacked a frame-work allowing for a rational way to acknowledge a possibility of actually experiencing the absolute. For Kant, the absolute had to stay separated from the moral subject, Mou seems to suggest, because of the "exclusive" character of the Christian doctrine, which is a theology and hence unable to conceive of the absolute as anything else than an "anthropomorphic God."
Trapped in Paradox: On Critique and Dogmatism

A First Conclusion: Reason and Tradition Unreconciled -The Failure of Moral Metaphysics
Mou's philosophized Confucianism vests into a Kantian guise the transmission of knowledge and practice of the "genuine heart." Thus, "orthodox transmission" -as Julia Ching once translates daotong -just as in imperial Neo-Confucianism, "emerges finally as the transmission of the 'sage's hsin'." 49 This heart being a purely internal matter, the Confucian sage, though in possession of a higher level of truth, is divested of any means to make it understood to others. Neither his way of knowing nor his mode of speaking are communicable in an ordinary sense of the word. The truth of the sage's words therefore cannot be warranted by what he says but only by the fact that it is he who says it. Authority is transferred from the enunciation to the enunciator.
So far, our assessment of Mou's translation of Neo-Confucianism into philosophical terms seems rather sobering. Taking Mou's discussions of central Kantian concepts to the letter often simply leaves one at a loss. What is more, the peculiar fabric of Mou's philosophy indeed strongly suggests that it was not least designed for immunizing traditional morality and scholarship against the potentially detrimental impact of modernization.
Outlook: Resolving the Contradiction -Rationalizing Tradition
At the beginning of this essay, I announced that I intended to adumbrate the possibility of a more reconciliatory and charitable perspective on Mou's moral metaphysics. In this endeavor, I proceed in two steps.
First, I compare Mou's attempt to rescue the authority of tradition to Hegel's endeavor to vindicate the revealed truth of Christianity. Not only do both Hegel and Mou side with a transmitted truth whose value is questioned by the universal claim of the truth of reason, but both thinkers also emphasize the role of the subject.
In a second step, I proceed to ask -all by admitting the inextricable incom patibilities resulting from Mou's intertwining of Kantianism, Confucianism, and Buddhism -if there is a way of making good sense of Mou's moral metaphysics. I argue that among philosophers, Mou is by no means alone in his liberal use of his predecessors' concepts and ideas, and that consequently his thought indeed deserves our attempt to make better sense of it. I think that one can read Mou as saying something relevant about human freedom, and I suggest that his talk about the unlimited or finite character of human beings can be read in a sense that is not exclusively figurative.
Mou and German Idealism: Defending Tradition
Let me now first turn to post-Kantian German philosophy. In the preface to his early work Christianity as a Positive Religion, Hegel writes that his essay intends to "derive that now discarded theology from what we now know as a need of human nature and would thus exhibit its naturalness and inevitability. An attempt to do this presupposes the belief that the convictions of many centuries, regarded as sacrosanct, true, and obligatory by the millions who lived and died by them in those centuries, were not, at least on their subjective side, downright folly or plain immorality. If the whole fabric of dogmatic theology is expounded, by the favorite method of using general concepts, as a relic of the Dark Ages, untenable in an enlightened epoch, we are still humane enough to raise the question: how is it possible to explain the construction of a fabric that is so repugnant to human reason and so erroneous through and through?" 50 When Hegel sets out to prove that dogmatic theology, which had come to be rejected as incompatible with the truth of reason, is in fact natural and hence inevitable, a central motive for him is his respect and appreciation for the millions who based all their hopes and their efforts on this allegedly altogether irrational and fundamentally absurd foundation. The deep scorn of his age for everything that was holy and valuable to previous centuries is for Hegel indicative of an attitude of outright inhumanity. And what is more, explaining the triumph of dogmatic theology as a mere result of a contamination of the "love of truth" by impure motives and instrumentalization for him "presupposes a deep contempt for man and the presence of a glaring superstition in his intellect." 51 The wholesale rejection of dogmatic theology in the name of enlightened reason, which, according to Hegel, plainly ignores the eternal to which religion had attached the accidental, eventually is to be blamed, in his view, for its superficiality. 52 Hegel aims to disprove the suspicion of the self-declared advocators of reason that the Christian faith because of its origin in Jesus' words and deeds can be regarded as merely positive and hence eventually accidental in character. By "positive" Hegel designates religion as based on mere authority and handed down as a matter of fact. He opposes to it the "subjective," which refers to religion as arising from people's hearts.
Hegel's attempt at detecting the subjective aspects of the Christian faith here strikingly parallels Mou Zongsan's intention to argue for an interpretation of Confucian tradition that connects authority back to subjectivity. Mou denies the mere positivity or contingency of the Confucian Way. With Hegel he shares a high respect for the tradition in which he stands and the belief that the testimony of the centuries forbids one simply to discard it as outright folly.
Widening our scope on nineteenth-century German philosophy, it seems admissible to argue that German idealism to a considerable degree could be characterized by the aim of reconciling truth of reason and truth of revelation -very obviously so in the work of Schelling. In a way, tradition is here defended against the suspicion of mere accident and hence both inessentiality and irrelevance by reinterpreting it under the guidance of reason. That such a need came to be felt is obviously connected to the fact that the age of enlightenment in general and Kantian critique in particular have presented ways not only of conceiving morality in exclusively rational and subjective terms, but also of conceiving religion purely in terms of morality. Mou Zongsan, this is to say, shares with German idealists not only the concern for a tradition apparently rendered widely obsolete but also the philosophical point of referencethe imposition of the solid rock of Kantian critique. 53 Just like Hegel, who remarks that religion becomes positive only when it contradicts freedom, Mou, too, contrary to the clamor of radical iconoclasts in China's twentieth century, intends to show that it is, after all, the spirit of freedom rather than of slavery that makes up the core of Confucianism.
Subjectivity and the End of Authority
This last point eventually allows us to adumbrate a slight dialectical twist -arguably unintended -in Mou's argument: in my previous discussion I expressed my concerns regarding the complete internalization of Mou's moral metaphysics and the intriguing lack of any external criteria for evaluating its claims. Let us, for now, concentrate on the critical potential that a philosophy may have in engendering a process of emancipation of the individual, rather than on the sort of epistemological critique in the more technical sense we have been concerned with so far. The kind of commitment to ideals of general acceptance and high prestige such as freedom or virtue, emphatically proclaimed in Mou's confession of a substantial Confucian humaneness along with the obvious lack of verifiable external criteria, at least in principle opens up space for anyone to claim his or her share in these precious goods. True, the very lack of explicit criteria gives way to arbitrariness if one likes to put it in negative terms. Yet, isn't this what under more favorable circumstances we could just as well call by the notable name of freedom? The teacher whose authority rests exclusively on his internal experience, which remains ineffable and hence inexplicable to anyone else, also has nothing to oppose to someone else who lays claim on the same authority except his belief and his appeal to other generally acknowledged authorities.
By his choice of placing the subjective awareness and realization of the genuine heart at the center of his moral metaphysics, Mou evidently valued these higher than the authority of the Sage. Confucius after all is the Sage only because he perfectly embodies the genuine heart. Stripped of the seal of the genuine heart there simply can be no authority for Confucius. By will or not: what can be suspected as a tool for monopolizing for the Confucian expert on inner morality the privilege of interpreting tradition, and what can be argued to have been coined exactly for this purpose, if taken seriously, at the same time deprives that expert of any means whatsoever for plausibly arguing for his privilege on the basis of reference to anything non-internal. If Mou presents himself as a Confucian authority on the basis of his knowledge and education rather than his wisdom -which is what he doubtless does -he eventually seems to fail on his own standards.
As Zheng Jiadong has noticed, the fact that Mou's attempts at rehabilitating Confucianism hardly leave the narrow confines of academia suggests that he actually joins in a tradition of scholarship rather than a practice of the Confucian Way. 54 He doubts that Mou's New Confucianism is able to live up to its own ideal of unifying scholarship and practical teaching. 55 We might add that even if this would turn out to be possible, scholarship has definitely forfeited the means for canceling the consequences of Mou's philosophization of tradition: if Mou indeed succeeds in proving that Confucianism in its essence is subjective rather than positive, this irrevocably implies the priority of what he came to designate by the Kantian name of moral autonomy over any merely accidental fact about historical Confucianism. If Confucianism has really become subjective, if its core is warranted by reason -as Mou claims -and if, therefore, it has become necessary or inevitable rather than a mere accident of history, this also means that its immanent validity exclusively rests on its rational nature -be it accessed via conceptual thought or intellectual intuition.
The Irreducibility of Freedom: Making Sense of Mou's TwoTiered Ontology
In the final part of this essay I eventually want to come back to Mou's philosophy proper. Much of the criticism of Mou's reference to Kant's thought -my own included -tries to make sense of his writings by taking to the letter the Kantian concepts to which he refers. One might at least ask whether this is actually doing justice to him. Just think of the freedom that Kant accords himself in reinterpreting, say, Plato's concept of idea, Aristotle's concept of category, or the rationalist notion of the thing-in-itself: it seems quite clear that none of these appropriations would be approved by experts strictly insisting on the meaning of these concepts in their original context. It therefore seems almost imperative at least to attempt a more conciliatory reading of Mou. 56 At this point, my own attempt has to remain very modest: what I would like to emphasize is that Mou tells us much more than might be expected from his hermeticizing discourse on intellectual intuition and the perfect teaching. In his monograph on the Perfect Good, Mou writes about the freedom of a human being: "Although our existence in terms of our individual lives is something defined (jicheng 既成), it can still be improved [changed toward the good]. . . . Although all things between heaven and earth are defined existences, they still are not determined (dingxing 定性) existences." 57 If we follow Mou and accept that their moral feeling enables humans to become agents of the genuine heart and if we agree that, in this, what they do indeed is to act freely, then we have to admit a way in which the agent of free will, noumenal according to Mou, can guide acts affecting and transforming the natural world. If Mou states that humans are defined, he seems to admit the triviality that as physical beings we are following the laws of nature. Now, we might argue that our experience in fact also tells us that there are many situations where we are free to decide what we do and what we don't. Our commonsense perspective seems to defy any attempt at declaring this experienced fact as mere illusion. If I decide to drop a book, there are doubtless many physical processes involved -in my brain and my nervous and muscular systems, as well as in the physical body of the book and the surrounding setting. Yet, although it is quite certain that there is, in my brain, a neural, and hence physical, state contemporaneous with my mental state of deciding to drop the book, people like Putnam have argued, convincingly in my view, that there is no functional relation, let alone an identity, between that physical state and the mental content.
If humans were nothing but natural beings, they would be entirely determined by the laws of nature. Free will would only be a subjective illusion. Of course, as natural beings humans, just like all other natural things, are physical and hence determined by the laws of nature -they are what Mou calls "defined" in the lines above. Yet given the complexity of the entirety of human experience, both Sellars and Putnam have argued that it is simply not conceivable that each and every element in it is reducible to a physical event in the sense of an eliminative naturalism.
For Mou, too, laws of nature imply essentially rational factors -namely their logical or mathematical structures. And even if Mou could be proven wrong on this point, the laws of nature have to be related to everyday experiences and practices in order to play any explanatory role. Even if an explanation is conceived of as eliminative, one has to know what it eliminates in order to recognize it as an explanation. That the scientific picture of the world will at some point entirely replace what Sellars called its manifest picture simply seems improbable, as the scientific picture remains totally opaque if entirely dissociated from the latter. This does not mean that the reality that the natural laws capture depends on our knowledge of it. But it claims that the conception of this reality as laws is not comprehensible, and impossibly understood in terms of eliminative explanation, if it is isolated from its embedding in the highly redundant world of everyday experience.
But let us get back to free will: if it is already erroneous to assume that mental states can either be identified with or functionally related to neurophysical states, how much more difficult would it seem to imagine that such combinations of mental states and actions are in any straightforward way explained in merely physical terms? It seems to me that Mou's distinction between "defined" and "determined" might indicate a possibility to conceive his self-declared belief in freedom as something more than a simple belief: Mou is convinced and tries to show that even the very possibility of natural science is essentially based on our human condition -for example the human need to think in terms of objects and relations -if one is to think at all. We might therefore try to argue, in Mou's vein, that just like the idea of freedom, the very idea of explanation, and hence all attempts to eliminate freedom as a legitimate concept of human self-reflection, depends on specifically human preconditions. Although it may be useful for some scientific investigations to try to eliminate mental factors like will, it appears that it is unconceivable as a matter of principle systematically to relate a person's proneness to understand herself as acting freely to a specific neurophysical state of her brain.
Of course, the preceding lines have only drawn a coarse sketch of what would need to be developed and expounded in much more detail. What I intended to suggest is simply that there is a way of making sense of Mou's talk of intellectual intuition, a way of lifting its concealing veil and relating it to our everyday experience. It seems possible to address the questions Mou raises without taking to the letter the apparent impenetrability of his kind of moral metaphysics to any kind of discursive mode of speaking. If Mou's emphasis on the internal aspect of meaning, on the individual and intuitive accessibility of moral acting, on the irreducibility to a merely descriptive or regimented language of central human experiences can be dissociated from the grandiloquence of his metaphysical musings on the absolute, there not only seems to be a way toward understanding the problems that Mou's moral metaphysics attempts to address, but it might even seem possible to make sense of his "two-tiered ontology": if it is essential to man that any one of us enters life in a way that is irreducibly individual, internal, and only marginally communicable, if the language we speak and that we interpret out of our individual experience as human beings in interaction with other human beings is only in part reducible to the kind of regimented language used in the sciences, to name but two aspects suggested by Mou's thought, it is mistaken, we might infer, to try to reduce ourselves to the picture provided by the systematizing efforts of science.
More generally, we are called to withstand any temptation to reduce ourselves to any picture, any representation, whatsoever. Drawing pictures of themselves is essential to humans. Yet, so is acting, the dimension that is, after all, reflected in these pictures. These two modes of being human, the representing and the acting, are mutually dependent, and reducing man to either is fundamentally mistaken. This is the reason why it would be wrong to endorse fully a scientific picture denying human freedom. It would mean that we mistake what is inevitably one possible picture among others as an ultimate fact about ourselves. If this kind of reductionism leads to denying something to man, as Mou puts it with respect to intellectual intuition, what had always been available to him, it is guilty of severely impeding man's development toward perfection -the declared aim of Mou's doctrine of humaneness. A picture is only meaningful in relation to human activity: every picture furthermore favors certain decisions while disfavoring others.
To do justice to Mou it seems important for me to notice that this does not mean that these pictures are but illusions or but appearance. Rather, they are warranted by the multiplicity of human activity that they depict. Yet, there are various pictures of the world and of ourselves. We know that one and the same experience is amenable to most divergent representations. That this is possible seems to presuppose an insight into the basis these various pictures draw upon. This seems a plausible way of making sense of what Mou sometimes refers to as a lived experience of acting as opposed to mere representation. It is the former that he tries to capture with his notion of intellectual intuition. If so, its function to me seems to be regulative -it reminds us that any representation refers back to an act -which is not representable itself.
In this view, the contrast between a representing and non-representing ontology might simply refer to the mutual interdependence of the many pictures in which we conceive ourselves and the immediacy of our experience in actu of ourselves. The latter is what warrants that we are free to choose some pictures of ourselves and to refuse others. Because there is no picture that is fully adequate with respect to our immediate experience, it is demanded that we do not take the distinctions suggested by the pictures as the last word. As in different circumstances, these pictures themselves might have been different; they are all merely relative. Our actions are therefore to be directed toward reconciliation rather than exclusion or separation. Yes, it is true that intellectual intuition in this sense is normatively void in that it is unable to tell us what, in a specific situation, we have to do. 58 However, it seems that it can perfectly well give us a criterion for deciding which out of a certain number of alternative actions has to be chosen -namely the one that has the greatest potential for reconciliation. It can, that is, have a normative function also in evaluating alternative possibilities to act upon. The kind of pre-predicative experience, as we might call it in a phenomenologically inspired vocabulary, that enables one to become aware that one and the same event is amenable to utterly different representations -all equally highlighting certain aspects while blinding out others -in Mou's view thus seems to be a precondition of our human experience, although we are unable to entirely explicate it in analytical terms.
Whether or not we deem such a thing as a pre-predicative experience possible, whether or not we regard it as relevant to issues of epistemology or ontology, what it allows is to make plausible why Mou thinks of that lived experience as a transcen dental foundation of knowledge. Although hardly reconcilable with the Kantian notion of transcendentality, this use of the term nonetheless becomes traceable. In terming this assumed unrepresentable yet experienceable basis of human knowledge transcendental rather than transcendent, Mou simply takes into account that it does not transcend human experience: it would simply be wrong to call it transcendent. As a fundamental experience it is within the scope of human activity. As something that, at the same time, evades any attempt at fully explicating it in analytical terms, it marks a boundary of objective knowledge. Eventually, such a fundamental experience, although not entirely explicable in discursive language, is nonetheless communicable. We can tell others about the most intimate experiences of our lives even if we admit that they are not reducible to propositions. In the metaphorical or paradoxical language of poetry, parables, or allusions, in the various kinds of non-technical, non-regimented modes of language, we are able to share with others that to which we ascribe an existential import to our lives. Or, to speak with Hegel, humans "can talk about what happened to them as the persons they are. 2 -A "type of truth" that, as N. Serina Chan puts it, "should regulate daily living in China" (N. Serina Chan, The Thought of Mou Zongsan, p. 92).
As the Buddha has introduced discursive explanations (fenbie shuo 分別說), there needs to be a different method of instruction allowing him to turn the obstructions within this differentiating speech into a universal teaching (tonghua 通化). This method allows one to recognize that in spite of the instrumental role of differentiating speech, all and everything in its entirety is but one so that all distinctions are swept away by the disappearance of any differentiating characteristics whatsoever, that consequently, one is allowed neither to give in to fixation nor to submit to obstruction, that there is nothing either to be chosen or to be refuted. This "different way" is the dharma-gate of non-contending wisdom (wuzheng bore 無諍般若). (Mou, Foxing yu bore, p. 1205)
22 -On the reason for the "non-contending" character of Buddha's speech Mou writes:
